Salpy Kanimian
Salpy Kanimian
Բարեւ | مرحباً | Hello, & Welcome!
I am a PhD candidate in the department of Economics at Rice University. My research lies at the intersection of health economics and empirical industrial organization. Specifically, I study the design and regulation of health insurance markets and structurally similar markets, such as workers’ compensation, that combine public oversight with private provision. Before joining Rice, I completed a dual degree in Mathematics and Economics at the American University of Beirut.
I am on the 2025-2026 job market.
Outside of academia, I serve as an advisor for the Foundation for Armenian Science and Technology (FAST)'s Generation AI Program, a nationwide initiative preparing the next generation to lead in emerging technologies.
My CV is available here, Resume here, and I can be reached out at salpy@rice.edu
News:
My paper with Vivian Ho on rising insurance premiums, Which Medical Prices are Driving Health Insurance Premium Growth?, is now in JAMA Network Open! We provided additional commentary and recommendations in The Conversation.
"Spatial Disparities, Selection, and Segmentation in Health Insurance". JOB MARKET PAPER [This Version: December 2025]
Abstract: Most U.S. means-tested programs use uniform eligibility thresholds that ignore regional cost of living differences. I study whether and how adjusting eligibility thresholds to local cost of living shape selection, sorting, and segmentation in adjacent health insurance markets: Medicaid and health insurance marketplaces. I develop and estimate a model where the regulator sets eligibility rules, insurers compete on price and quality, and consumers choose or are assigned to plans. I find that adjusting eligibility thresholds for cost of living creates competing effects: it improves coverage by crowding low-income families into insurance in high-cost areas, but also reshuffles risk pools across both programs in ways that change premiums and plan quality. Counterfactual simulations using administrative data from California show that partial cost of living indexing yields higher welfare per public dollar than either uniform thresholds or full indexing. These results demonstrate how eligibility design interacts with market structure and insurer incentives in segmented health insurance systems.